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SECURITIES
OVERVIEW
During the recent survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided three cases' involving either the Securities Act of 19332 (1933 Act)
or the Securities and Exchange Commission Act of 19343 (1934 Act). A
fourth case, Chandler v. KEW, Inc. ,4 was ordered published during the survey
period and is discussed in this section.
Chandler's publication reinforced the Tenth Circuit's leading position in
the ongoing debate over whether the sale of 100% of the stock in a corpora-
tion is a securities transaction within the purview of federal securities laws.5
In a similar case, Hackford v. First Security Bank,6 the court refused to treat an
instrument's denomination as "stock" as the controlling factor in deciding
whether the securities laws applied to a transaction. 7 Zobrist V. Coal-A, Inc. "
examined the scope of an investor's duty of diligence when purchasing a
security.9 The fourth case, Baum v. Great Western Cities, Inc. ,10 merely upheld
a jury's finding that plaintiffs had failed to prove the scienter required to
establish a violation of rule lOb-5.1" Baum, because of its limited preceden-
tial importance, will not be discussed in this survey.
1. Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983); Baum v. Great Western Cities,
Inc., 
703 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1983); Hackford v. First Sec. Bank, No. 81-1863 (10th Cir. Jan.
31, 1983).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
4. 691 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1977) (ordered published Oct. 18, 1982).
5. Compare, e.g. , Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981); Fredericksen
v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981) (holding that the sale of
100% of the stock in a corporation is not a securities transaction) with Seagrave Corp. v. Vista
Resources, Inc., 696 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1982); Golden v. Garafolo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982)
(holding that such transactions fall within the purview of the securities laws). See also Dillport,
Restortng Balance to the Defition of Security, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 99 (1982); Seldin, When Stock Is Not a
Security.- The "Sale of Business Doctrine" under the Federal Security Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 637 (1981);
Thompson, The Shrinking Definition ofa Security: Why Purchasing All ofa Company's Stock Is Not a
Federal Security Transaction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 225 (1982); Note, Securities Law, 65 MARQ. L.
REV. 487 (1982).
6. No. 81-1863 (10th Cir. Jan. 31, 1983).
7. See infra notes 40-67 and accompanying text.
8 708 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983).
9. See infra notes 67-102 and accompanying text.
10. 703 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1983).
11. Id. at 1206, 1210-11. Rule IOb-5, an anti-fraud rule promulgated under section 10b of
the Securities and Exchange Commission Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1982), is codified at 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). The Supreme Court has held that proof of some degree of scienter is
necessary to establish a violation of rule lOb-5 when plaintiffs seek money damages under the
rule, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), but has not ruled on whether proof of
reckless behavior satisfies the scienter requirement. Id at 194 n.12. Accord Aaron v. SEC, 446
U.S. 680, 686 n.5 (1980). The Tenth Circuit holds the scienter element established upon proof
of reckless behavior. Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982). Ilackbart is discussed
in last year's Tenth Circuit Survey. See Securities, Ninth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 60 DEN. L.J.
373, 373-80 (1982).
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I. CHANDLER V. KEW, INC. THE SALE OF BUSINESS DOCTRINE
A. The Case
Chandler charged defendant KEW, Inc. with securities fraud in the sale
of a liquor business.12 Chandler contended that because the sales contract
for the liquor store included 100% of defendant's outstanding corporate
stock, and because "stock" was defined as a security by the 1933 and 1934
Acts, 13 the transaction was subject to federal securities laws.' 4 The trial
court rejected plaintiffs argument, and dismissed Chandler's claim for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction. '5 In a tersely worded opinion, the Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed the trial court and held that the sale of 100% of the stock in a
liquor store as part of the sale of the business was not a securities transaction
within the meaning of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
16
Relying on Unted Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,17 the court rejected
plaintiff's argument that KEW's sale of stock in the liquor business should be
considered a security transaction simply because the statutory definition of
security included the word "stock."' 8 The court viewed Forman as limiting
the application of the federal securities laws to those transactions in which
the "economic reality" involved an investment in the investment scheme of
another. 19 The economic reality of Chandler's transaction was the sale of
ownership of a business via transfer of stock, rather than the sale of stock qua
security.20 Hence, the transaction was not subject to federal securities laws.
12. Chandler v. KEW, Inc., 691 F.2d 442, 443 (10th Cir. 1983).
13. The 1933 Act defines "security" in 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1982). This section provides:
[U]nless the context otherwise requires-(l) the term "security" means any note, stock,
treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or par-
ticipation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certifi-
cate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or
other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certif-
icate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based
on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a
national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or
instrument commonly known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participa-
tion in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of. or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Id (emphasis supplied).
The 1934 Act's definition of security is found in 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982). This defini-
tion is almost identical to that found in the 1933 Act; the primary difference between the two
definitions is the 1934 Act's exclusion of short-term notes. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1982)
with 15 U.S.C. § 7 8 c(a)(10)(1 98 2). The minor differences between the two Acts have been
found to lack controlling significance. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 342 (1967);
Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See also International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 556 n.7 (1979).
14. 691 F.2d at 443.
15. Id Both the 1933 and 1934 Acts contain provisions for federal jurisdiction over suits
asserting violations of those Acts. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)(1982)(1933 Act); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa(1982)(1934 Act). Lack of diverse citizenship between the parties precluded subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction once the federal securities claims were dismissed. 691 F.2d at 334.
16. 691 F.2d at 444.
17. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
18. 691 F.2d at 443, See supra note 13.
19. See 691 F.2d at 443-44.
20. Id at 444.
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B. The Sale of Business Doctrine
Chandler, although published belatedly, was the first post-Forman appel-
late recognition of the sale of business doctrine. 2 1 This doctrine restricts the
application of federal securities laws to those stock transfers which have the
indicia of an investment in a security. Stock transfers which are in effect
merely evidence of a commercial sale of property are, under this doctrine,
beyond the scope of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
22
The source of this restriction on the protection of federal law is found in
the Supreme Court opinions setting out the identifying characteristics of
those investments constituting federal securities. 23  Lower courts applying
the sale of business doctrine read the Court's classificatory opinions as man-
dating an inquiry into the economic reality of an alleged securities transac-
tion regardless of the formal denomination of the instruments involved.
2 4
Only when that inquiry reveals the type of investment contemplated by the
1933 and 1934 Acts (33/34 Act investment) 25 will federal securities laws be
applicable to a transaction.
26
Forman is the Court's most recent delineation of the general characteris-
tics of a 33/34 Act investment. Under Forman, application of the federal
securities laws is justified whenever there is an investment of valuable consid-
eration in an enterprise with the expectation that the enterprise will generate
profits through the management of a promoter or other third party.2 7 Thus,
even though an instrument may be denominated "stock," it is not a 33/34
Act investment unless the transaction involving the instrument manifests the
basic economic realities described immediately above.
28
The sale of business doctrine is a specific example of how courts apply
21. Seldin, supra note 5, at 642.
22. Frederiksen v. Poloway, 643 F.2d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017
(1981). Accord Thompson, supra note 5, at 252. See also Dillport, supra note 5, at 114. Cf SEC v.
C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 348 (1943) (fact that reality of transaction was not
commercial sale of leasehold interest supported finding that transaction involved a security).
23. E.g., United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1977); SEC v. WJ. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
24. E.g., King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (11 th Cir. 1982); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 643 F.2d
1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); Chandler v. KEW, Inc., 691 F.2d 443 (10th
Cir. 1977).
25. The phrase "33/34 Act investment" is used in lieu of the statutory phrase "security" in
order to emphasize the judicial focus on the economic reality of a transaction rather than the
transaction's formal characteristics.
26. See, e.g., King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (1 1th Cir. 1982); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 643
F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).
27. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1977). Forman left open
an important question which has occupied the circuit courts since SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293 (1943), the decision Forman relys on in articulating the factors distinguishing commer-
cial transactions from securities transactions. See 421 U.S. at 852 (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1943)). Howey required an expectation of profits solely from the efforts of
others. 388 U.S. at 301. Forman noted that the Ninth Circuit, in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973), had held that a security
was present even though profits were partially dependent on the investors' efforts. 421 U.S. at
852 n. 16 (citing Turner, 474 F.2d at 482). The Court, however, refrained from commenting on
the Turner holding. 421 U.S. at 852 n. 16. But see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439
U.S. 551, 560 n. 12 (1979) (stating that the required investment may be in form of services, citing
Forman's recognition of Turner).
28. Forman, 421 U.S. at 848, 850-51.
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Forman's economic realities concept to evaluate a class of investment transac-
tions. Typically, courts applying the doctrine find that the transfer of 100%
of a business' stock divests the seller of management prerogative, thereby
precluding application of the federal securities laws.29 Thus, although the
purchase of a business may be an investment in the conventional sense, it is
not an investment entitled to the protection of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
Not all circuits accept the sale of business doctrine, however. Those
courts which reject the doctrine do not read Forman to establish the economic
reality inquiry as the sole determinant of a statutory security. 30 According
to these courts, the federal securities laws are applicable when a transaction
involves either instruments having the characteristics normally associated
with that type of instrument 3' or when the transaction has the economic
reality of a 33/34 Act investment. 32 These courts read Forman as containing
two holdings: first, the instruments involved lacked the normal attributes of
stock and therefore were not securities, and second, the instruments involved
were not securities as a matter of economic reality. 3 3 Both types of purchas-
ers are entitled to federal protection, the latter because Congress intended to
protect the unwary and the former because purchasers of instruments com-
monly understood to be securities are entitled to rely on the protection of
federal securities laws.
3 4
Regardless of the merits of reading Forman to establish two standards for
identifying securities within the meaning of the 1933 and 1934 Acts,35 Chan-
dler and Christy v. Cambron,36 another recent Tenth Circuit decision, 37 clearly
establish that the economic reality test is the sole relevant inquiry in the
Tenth Circuit. Thus, unless the purchaser of a business can establish that
29. Eg. King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (11 th Cir. 1982); Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654
F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981).
30. See, e.g., Golden v. Garafolo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1144 (2d Cir. 1982); Mifflin Energy Re-
sources, Inc. v. Brooks, 501 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Titsch Printing, Inc., v. Hastings, 456
F. Supp. 445 (D. Colo. 1978); Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
31. For example, an instrument will be considered stock within the meaning of the 1933
and 1934 Acts when it entitles the owner to dividends, can be hypothecated, and bears other
indicia traditionally associated with instruments denominated "stock." See Golden, 678 F.2d at
1144; Mifin Energy Resources, 501 F. Supp. at 336; Titsch Printing, Inc., 456 F. Supp. at 449;
Bronstei, 407 F. Supp. at 929-30.
32. See Golden, 678 F.2d at 1144; Titsch Printing, Inc., 456 F. Supp. at 449.
33. E.g., Golden, 678 F.2d at 1144; Titsch Printing, Inc., 456 F. Supp. at 449. Accord Dillport,
supra note 5, at 115. But see Thompson, supra note 5, at 246-50 (Forman requires analysis of
nature of underlying transaction to determine applicability of federal securities laws regardless
of the formal characteristics of a transferred instrument).
34. Mifkn Energy Sources, Inc., 501 F. Supp. at 336; Titsch Prthng Co., 501 F. Supp. at 449.
Golden also rejects limiting federal protection to instruments satisfying the economic reality test,
but on a different basis than MufFin and Titsch. Golden reasoned that the careful statutory list of
covered instruments, see supra note 13, would have been superfluous had Congress intended to
adopt only the economic reality test. 698 F.2d at 1144-45. Further, to adopt the economic
reality test as exclusive would create uncertainty in the application of the Act, thereby under-
mining its prophylactic effect. See id at 1146.
35. Compare Thompson, supra note 5, at 246-50 (rejecting dual standards) with Dillport,
supra note 5, at 114-16 (supporting dual standards).
36. 710 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1983).




the seller has retained control over management of the business,38 in all
probability the buyer will be required to resort to state law remedies for
fraud and misrepresentation.
3 9
II. GRAZING RIGHTS AS A FEDERAL SECURITY
During the survey period the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also relied
on the economic reality inquiry to arrive at a decision concerning the nature
of the instruments involved in Hackfordv. First Securzt' Bank .4o The dispute in
Hackford grew out of the distribution of Ute Indian reservation lands follow-
ing execution of the Ute Indian Supervision Termination Act 4t (Termina-
tion Act). The Termination Act divided members of the Ute Tribe into two
classifications: "full blood" (those who are at least one-half Ute Indian and
more than one-half Indian ancestry); 4 2 and "mixed blood" (those who are
part Ute Indian but who do not qualify as full bloods) .4 3 In accordance with
the Termination Act, 490 mixed bloods received 172,000 acres of range land
as part of their share of the partition of Ute tribal assets. 4 4 To facilitate the
distribution, the mixed bloods formed two nonprofit corporations to main-
tain the rangelands. 45 Each mixed blood then surrendered his interest in the
land for a share in each corporation. 46 Each share permitted a member to
graze a specified number of cattle and sheep for a specified number of days
each year.
47
First Security Bank was designated as the transfer agent for the shares,
and in addition was named by the Secretary of the Interior to act as trustee
for assets owned by mixed blood incompetents and minors. 48 The full
bloods, with permission of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, offered the mixed
bloods, and the bank acting as trustee, $1100 per share for the range corpo-
ration stock.49 The bank, in accordance with Department of Interior regula-
38. See Christy v. Cambron, 710 F.2d 669, 672 &n.1 (purchasers of less than 100% of shares
not entitled to bring action under federal securities laws because their participation in venture
precluded finding profits were derived from efforts of others). But see Crowley v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 570 F.2d 875, 877 (10th Cir. 1975) (security present where essential managerial
efforts those of seller of investment) (citing SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters. Inc., 474 F.2d 476
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973)).
39. Forman stated that the name given an instrument might lead a purchaser to rely on the
protection of the federal securities laws, especially when the instrument "embodies some of the
significant characteritics typically associated with the named instrument." 421 U.S. at 850-51.
Theoretically, therefore, an investor might be entitled to federal protection even absent
purchase of an "economically real" security. It should be noted, however, that the Seventh
Circuit, which has adopted the sale of business doctrine, recently held that the purchaser of a
business could not justifiably rely on federal security law protection because of the commercial
nature of the purchase transaction. Canfield v. Rapp & Son, 654 F.2d 459, 466 n.7 (7th Cir.
1981).
40. No. 81-1863 (10th Cir. Jan. 31, 1983).
41. 25 U.S.C. §§ 677-677aa (1982).
42. Id § 677a(b).
43. Id § 677a(c).
44. Hackbart v. First Sec. Bank, No. 81-1863, slip op. at 2-3 (10th Cir. Jan. 31, 1983).
45. Id at 3.
46. Id
47. Id




tions, offered the shares to the mixed bloods, the full bloods, and to the Ute
Tribe as a whole for at least $1100 per share.50 This offer was accepted by
the full bloods. 5 '
The plaintiffs in Hackford represented a class of mixed blood trust bene-
ficiaries whose stock was sold to the full bloods. 52 Among other allega-
tions, 53 the plaintiffs contended that the bank violated the antifraud
provisions of rule lOb-5 54 and section l0b of the Securities and Exchange
Commission Act of 1934. 5  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying
the economic reality analysis articulated in SECv. W.j. Howe, Co. ,56 rejected
the plaintiffs' charge, ruling that the shares in the range corporations were
not securities within the meaning of the 1934 Act.
5 7
Howey defined a security transaction as an investment in a common en-
terprise with the expectation of profits to be derived solely from the efforts of
others. 58 In Hackford, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the range corporation
stock failed the expectation of profits branch of the Howe, test for several
reasons. First, the range corporation was organized as a nonprofit corpora-
tion under Utah law, precluding any reasonable expectation of distribu-
tions.59 Second, the court found that any intent to capture any appreciation
in stock value caused by corporate activities was incidental to the real pur-
pose of the group, which was to facilitate grazing for its members. 60 Because
the primary motivation in acquiring the shares was use of the tribal prop-
erty, the mixed bloods lacked the necessary profit motivation. 6 1 Alternately,
the lack of evidence that the corporation had been promoted as a source of
profits precluded any finding of profit motivation by those mixed bloods not
50. Id
51. Id.
52. Id at 5.
53. The plaintiffs also alleged the bank breached its fiduciary trust obligations by not max-
imizing the sale price of the range land. The trial court ruled that the bank had set an appro-
priate price; this finding was upheld by the Tenth Circuit. Id at 11-12.
54. 29 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1983). Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the sale of any
security.
Id.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
56. 328 U.S. 293 (1943). The Howey analysis served as the basis of the Forman holding. See
supra note 27.
57. No. 81-1863, slip op. at 9.
58. 328 U.S. at 301.
59. No. 81-1863, slip op. at 8. Se, UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-6-21 (1953) (incorporation under
nonprofit corporation act limited to corporations not organized for pecuniary purposes).
60. No. 81-1863, slip op. at 8. Cf Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036
(10th Cir. 1980) (recognizing expectation of capital appreciation satisfies Hlowe expectation of
profits inquiry).




wishing to graze cattle. 62
The court also ruled that the stock failed the third part of the Howey
test-that profits be derived from the efforts of a promoter or other third
party.63 The court did not provide an explicit basis for this conclusion. Pre-
sumably, the fact that the corporations were required to obtain 85% of their
income from shareholder assessments 64 and the overall nonprofit nature of
the operation 65 precluded an expectation of profits from the efforts of
others.
66
III. DELINEATION OF THE CONTOURS OF JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE IN A
RULE lOb-5 ACTION
The question of the degree of diligence necessary to find justifiable reli-
ance in a private rule lOb-5 action was addressed by the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Zobrzst v. Coal-A, Inc. 67 Holdsworth v. Strong,68 the first Tenth
Circuit opinion to address this issue, held that an investor was required to
prove that he justifiably relied on defendant's material misrepresentations in
order to recover under rule 10b-5.69 Under Holdsworth, justifiable reliance
could be proved in either of two ways, depending on the nature of the al-
leged misrepresentation. If the misrepresentation consisted of an omission to
state facts necessary to prevent a statement from being misleading, justifiable
reliance was shown upon proof that the omissions were material. 70  If the
misrepresentations consisted of affirmative misstatements, the factfinder was
required to evaluate the facts and circumstances surrounding the misrepre-
sentation and determine whether plaintiff was entitled to base his investment
decision on the defendant's statements. 7i Zobrzst considered two issues. The
first was the extent to which a plaintiff was entitled to rely on oral statements
contradicting written warnings in a Private Placement Memorandum. 72 The
second was whether the inference of reliance arising from a material omis-
sion could be rebutted by defendants.
73
62. No. 81-1863, slip op. at 9.
63. Id. at 7, 9.
64. Id. at 7.
65. See id. at 8.
66. Cf International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 561 (1979) (fundamental
importance of employer contributions to success of pension plan indicative of lack of reliance on
managerial efforts of others to generate profits).
67. 708 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983).
68. 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. dented, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).
69. 545 F.2d at 696. The Tenth Circuit established the justifiable reliance requirement in
order to ensure that a defendant -as not penalized for misrepresentations which did not cause a
plaintiffs loss. By requiring a showing of reliance, the plaintiff established a prima facie case of
causality; by showing the reliance was justified in light of the circumstances of a case, the plain-
tiff established that the defendant was responsible for plaintiff's actions. See id. at 693-95.
70. Id at 695 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-
54 (1972)). An omission is material when "a reasonable investor would have considered the
facts important." 545 F.2d at 695.
71. See 545 F.2d at 695-97. Itoldsworth did not provide an explicit set of criteria for evaluat-
ing reliance on affirmative misstatements, indicating only that the plaintiff's fault in relying on
the misstatements must be less than the defendant's fault in making them. Id at 693.
72. Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1515 (10th Cir. 1983).




Zobrist arose when the investments of plaintiffs Herman Zobrist, Neil
Rasmussen, and Phil Rasmussen in Coal-X, Ltd./'76 74 appeared to have
misfired. Plaintiffs filed suit against Coal-X, Inc., the general partner of
Coal-X, Ltd./'76, and two of its officers who were alleged to have made false
and misleading oral statements regarding the probability of success of the
investment. 75 A federal district court jury found that the defendant officers
of Coal-X, Inc. had "knowingly violated rule lOb-5 by misrepresenting ma-
terial facts to Phil Rasmussen, that he justifiably relied on these misrepresen-
tations, and that . . . he suffered $50,000 in damages."'76  The jury also
found that the defendants had withheld material facts from Neil Rasmussen
and Herman Zobrist, but that these plaintiffs had not relied on those omis-
sions and were therefore not entitled to damages. 77 Coal-X, Inc. appealed
the decision in favor of Phil Rasmussen; Neil Rasmussen and Zobrist cross-
appealed the verdict in favor of Coal-X, Inc. 78
B. Effect of Failing to Read a Private Placement Memorandum
At the crux of the Tenth Circuit's disposition of the cross-appeal against
Phil Rasmussen was his failure to read the Private Placement Memorandum
the defendants had provided to all three plaintiffs. 79 This Memorandum
expressly recited the generally high risk of investing in a speculative business
venture, and the specific risks and difficulties involved in operating a coal
company. 80 Additionally, the Memorandum stated that no person had been
authorized to make representations not contained in the document, and that
potential investors should not rely on such representations.81 Although Phil
Rasmussen signed documents indicating he had read the Memorandum, it
was undisputed that neither Phil nor the other plaintiffs read the
document.
8 2
Based primarily on Phil Rasmussen's failure to read the Private Place-
ment Memorandum, the Tenth Circuit overturned the jury's finding of justi-
fiable reliance, and reversed the jury award of $50,000.83 The court reached
its decision by charging Phil Rasmussen with constructive knowledge of the
74. Coal-X, Ltd./'76 was a Utah limited partnership organized to finance a West Virginia
coal mining venture. Id at 1513.




79. The Coal-X Ltd./'76 stock was sold as a private offering pursuant to rule 146, 17
C.F.R. § 230.146 (1981). Compliance with rule 146 exempted issuers from the registration re-
quirements of the Securities Act of 1933. See Rule 146-Transactions by an Issuer Deemed Not
to Involve Any Public Offering, SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5487 (April 23, 1974). Rule
146 required issuers to furnish an offering memorandum with information essentially equivalent
to that provided by a prospectus. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e)(1) (1981). Rule 146 has since been
withdrawn, 47 Fed. Reg. 11261 (1982), and has been replaced by Regulation D, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.501-.506 (1983). See 47 Fed. Reg. 11252 (1982).
80. 708 F.2d at 1517.
81. Id at 1517-18.
82. Id at 1514.
83. Id at 1518-19.
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risks stated in the Private Placement Memorandum,8 4 and then examining
his conduct in light of that knowledge. The court found that Phil had acted
recklessly by relying on defendants' oral statements without investigating the
discrepancy between those statements and the risk factors contained in the
Memorandum.8 5 The court held that in light of his reckless behavior, Phil
Rasmussen's reliance on the defendants' fraudulent claims was
unjustifiable.
86
C. Presumption of Rehance on Aaterial Omission is Rebuttable
Neil Rasmussen and Zobrist argued that the trial court had improperly
instructed the jury that the plaintiffs bore the burden of proving reliance on
the defendants' omission of material facts.8 7 The district court's instruction
stated that once plaintiffs proved an intentional omission of material fact,
the defendants were required to prove that plaintiffs would have acted no
differently even if the omitted information had been disclosed. 88 The Tenth
Circuit held that this instruction was proper, because the trial court had
correctly instructed the jury that the presumption of reliance arising from
proof of an intentional material omission was a rebuttable presumption.8 9
Because plaintiffs had not read the Memorandum, substantial evidence sup-
ported the jury's verdict that the nondisclosures had not, in fact, caused
plaintiffs' actions, and that the plaintiff had therefore not relied on the
omissions.
9 °
D. Judge Holloway's Dissent
In a forceful dissent, Judge Holloway disagreed with the majority's
holding with respect to Phil Rasmussen. The dissent cited the portion of
Holdsworth v. Strong9 1 which held that a plaintiffs conduct in a securities
transaction could only bar recovery under rule lOb-5 when the plaintiff's
actions could be characterized as misconduct comparable to that of the de-
fendant. 92 Noting that the special verdict forms established that the defend-
ants had engaged in deliberate misconduct, 9 3 the dissent contended that
liability for intentional misconduct should not be immunized by a plaintiffs
negligence or recklessness.94 Judge Holloway perceived the federal concern
with deterring intentional misconduct to outweigh that of deterring negli-
84. Id at 1518. The Tenth Circuit noted that failure to charge an investor with knowledge
of the information contained in a Private Placement Memorandum would place that investor in
a better position, with respect to justifiable reliance, than the investor who had read the docu-
ment. Thus, to encourage investor prudence and to prevent unfairness to prudent investors,
knowledge of information supplied by legal mandate was imputed to an investor. Id
85. Id at 1518-19.
86. Id at 1518.
87. Id at 1519.
88. See id.
89. Id
90. Id at 1520.
91. 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).
92. 708 F.2d at 1520 (Holloway, J., dissenting). See Holdsworth, 545 F.2d at 693.
93. See 708 F.2d at 1520 & n.l (Holloway, J., dissenting).
94. Id at 1523. Judge Holloway also observed that the special verdicts had absolved Paul
Rasmussen of intentionally ignoring the possibility of misrepresentation. Id at 1522.
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gent or reckless conduct. 95 The majority's decision, which exonerated de-
fendants engaged in intentional misconduct through imputing knowledge of
"defendants' exculpatory boilerplate" 96 to the plaintiff, frustrated that pol-
icy. Accordingly, Judge Holloway dissented.
E. Critique
It is difficult to square the majority's decision in Zobrzsi with its holding
in Hloldsworth that a plaintiffs conduct bars recovery only when it is of com-
parable culpability to that of the defendant.97 Although Phil Rasmussen's
failure to read the Private Placement Memorandum clearly was negligent,
the court elevated this conduct to recklessness by the questionable artifice of
imputing constructive knowledge of the Memorandum's contents. 98 Even
accepting the court's finding of recklessness, it seems improper to equate the
plaintiffs recklessness with the defendants' deliberate fraud and misrepresen-
tation and bar all recovery for the plaintiff.99 The central purpose of the
1933 and 1934 Acts was to prevent fraud in the financial marketplace, not to
institutionalize caveat emptor1 0° Although the majority carefully noted
that constructive knowledge of the warnings contained in the Memorandum
could not, in and of itself, exonerate the defendants,' 0 ' the result reached by
the majority appears to unnecessarily protect, and perhaps encourage,10 2 se-
curities fraud.
Douglas D. Koktavy
95. Id. at 1522.
96. Id at 1523.
97. 545 F.2d at 693. See supra note 71.
98. But see Shappirio v. Goldberg, 192 U.S. 232 (1904). The Court, in rejecting a common
law fraud claim, held that "when the means of knowledge are open and at hand or furnished to
the purchaser or his agent and no effort is made to prevent the party from using them . . .he
will not be heard to say that he has been deceived to his injury by the misrepresentations of his
vendor." Id at 241-42.
99. Cf Note, A Comparative Fault Approach to the Due Dligence Requirement of Rule 10b-5, 49
FORDI-IAM L. REV. 561, 575-88 (1981) (author proposes adapting contributory fault principles
for use in securities fraud cases in order to avoid injustice of foreclosing all relief for negligent or
reckless plaintiffs deliberately defrauded in securities transactions).
100. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1977). See also Zobrist, 708
F.2d at 1523 (Holloway, J., dissenting) (the majority's holding acts to favor those found guilty of
knowing misconduct and to frustrate the antifraud policy of the securities laws and rule lOb-5).
101. 708 F.2d at 1517.
102. Judge Holloway cited evidence in the record indicating that the defendants had con-
sciously dissuaded the plaintiffs from reading the Memorandum. Id at 1522-23 (Holloway, J.,
dissenting).
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